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Abstract
It is often argued that multinationals are reluctant to transfer technology due to the
fear of spillovers. We show that this need not be the case if host country policies like
taxation are taken into account. Furthermore, we examine the incentives the multinational
and the host country have to engage in an international joint venture. We show why a
multinational may agree to enter a joint venture even though this gives rise to spillovers.
Surprisingly, we ¯nd that a joint venture is sometimes not in the interest of a host country,
despite the prospect of spillovers.
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Multinational ¯rms are frequently confronted with restrictions placed on the ownership struc-
ture of their foreign operation by local governments.1 In particular, developing and transition
countries that require shared ownership expect to bene¯t from technology spillovers. Multina-
tionals, on the other hand, are not always happy about such forced international joint ventures,
precisely because of the risk of involuntary spillovers.2
In this paper we examine the incentives a multinational has to transfer technology when
there are spillover e®ects. In particular, we study whether it is indeed in the local government's
best interest to require a joint venture agreement and whether it is in the multinational's interest
to oppose such a requirement. For this purpose, we look at how the ownership structure of a
multinational subsidiary a®ects the incentives the multinational has to transfer technology and
the incentive the local government has to support the multinational's activities.
In our model, we consider a multinational investor who decides how much technology to
transfer to a host country when there are potential spillovers. As intuition would suggest, we
¯nd that the larger the risk of spillovers, the less the multinational is inclined to transfer the
technology.
However, this result no longer holds if we allow the host country to play a more active role.
We examine two di®erent host country policy instruments - taxation and local infrastructure
investment. We ¯nd that these policy instruments help the multinational and the host country
to align their interests with respect to spillovers. Furthermore, our analysis shows that in
general spillovers need not have a negative e®ect on the incentive to transfer technology.
We also examine how the incentives of both parties can be controlled by means of the
ownership structure in an international joint venture. In our reference case, where the host
country does not play an active role, we ¯nd that both multinational and host country have
1The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not re°ect those of BaFin. We would
like to thank Jonathan Eaton and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.
2Such restrictions have been and still are prominent in countries like Russia, China, India, Indonesia, the
Republic of Korea and many others (UNCTC 1987). Moreover, in cases of privatization governments have often
retained a substantial share of the privatized assets (Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco 2004, Maw 2002).
2con°icting interests with respect to sharing cash °ow rights. However, a multinational may
voluntarily agree to a joint venture if this induces the host country to introduce a more favorable
policy vis µ a vis the foreign subsidiary. On the other hand, there are also circumstances where it
is not in the interest of the host country to form a joint venture. This conclusion should be of
particular interest to countries in Central and Eastern Europe and to other transition countries
where sharing of ownership is often required by host country governments.
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. The ¯rst is the theoretical literature on
foreign direct investments and sovereign risks. These papers study the implications for multi-
national investment where host countries cannot commit to not expropriating the investment.3
Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) show that the threat of nationalization may induce the foreign
investor to choose an ine±cient technology that makes nationalization less attractive to the
host country. Schnitzer (2002) points out that the multinational may opt for a joint venture if
this helps alleviate the sovereign risk problem.4
When we incorporate spillovers in our model, we ¯nd that these further reduce the multi-
national's incentive to transfer technology e±ciently. However, such spillovers are more likely
to occur if the host country has a share in the foreign subsidiary. Hence, an interesting question
we address is whether it can still be in the interest of a multinational to form a joint venture
in order to alleviate the sovereign risk, even if this further increases the risk of spillovers.
The second strand of literature is concerned with foreign direct investments and spillovers.
A number of empirical studies have attempted to assess the impact of foreign direct investment
on the productivity of domestic ¯rms.5 But the conclusions reached in these studies are mixed.6
Kokko (1994), Borensztein et al. (1998) and Xu (2000) show that positive spillovers are more
3The seminal article here is Eaton and Gersovitz (1983). See also Eaton (1993) and Eaton and Fernandez
(1995) for surveys on sovereign risk in the context of sovereign debt.
4Konrad and Lommerud (2001) show that asymmetric information between the MNE and the host country
concerning intra-¯rm trade between the MNE and its foreign a±liate is another possibility for alleviating the
hold-up problem in FDI. Selling shares of the a±liate to locals give the host government a further incentive to
reduce taxation.
5See Saggi (2002) or BlomstrÄ om and Kokko (1998) for recent surveys on international technology transfer
and spillovers.
6GÄ org and Strobl (2001) review the literature on multinational companies and productivity spillovers. They
argue that the empirical methods used, and whether cross-section or panel analysis is employed, may have an
e®ect on the empirical results.
3likely if the technology gap between foreign and domestic ¯rms is not too large and if a minimum
threshold of human capital exists. Aitken and Harrison (1999) on the other hand ¯nd negative
spillovers from foreign investment on domestically owned plants and state that the gains from
FDI appear to be entirely captured by joint ventures.7
Other empirical studies have examined the interaction of spillovers and the ownership
structure in joint ventures. BlomstrÄ om and SjÄ oholm (1999) argue that local participation in
international joint ventures facilitates spillovers. This, in turn, reduces the incentive for the
multinational to transfer technology and management skills. Their empirical results con¯rm
that domestic establishments bene¯t from spillovers in terms of productivity levels. However,
the degree of foreign ownership does not a®ect its extent. In contrast, Dimelis and Louri (2002)
¯nd evidence that the degree of foreign ownership matters, and that productivity spillovers are
stronger when foreign ¯rms are in minority positions. Similarly, Smarzynska Javorcik (2004)
reports positive spillovers from joint ventures with shared ownership in Lithuania, but not from
fully owned foreign investments.
As we will show in our model, the impact on technology spillovers of foreign direct invest-
ment in general and ownership structures in particular is not as clear cut as is often assumed.
This may help to explain why the empirical evidence is indeed mixed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3 we consider
the multinational's technology transfer for the benchmark case where the host country plays
no active role. Section 4 analyzes the impact of spillovers on technology transfer when the host
country can tax the foreign subsidiary. In section 5, we reconsider these e®ects for the case
where the host country can engage in infrastructure investments. Section 6 discusses empirical
implications of the model, while the ¯nal section concludes.
7Other studies that found evidence for negative spillovers include Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Djankov
and Hoekman (2000).
42 The Model
Consider a multinational enterprise (MNE) that is engaged in an investment project in a host
country (HC). The project generates a stochastic return of R with probability q and 0 with
probability (1 ¡ q). This probability is a®ected by MNE's decision to transfer technology. For
example, MNE may decide on the level of investment in training local workers and managers,
in marketing the goods produced , and in transferring or upgrading technology. Without loss of
generality, we assume that MNE chooses q 2 (0;1) directly at cost K(q).8 K(q) is an increasing,
strictly convex function with K0(0) = 0 and limq!1 K(q) = 1. The last assumption implies
that, for q su±ciently close to 1, K000(q) > 0. To guarantee uniqueness of the solutions for the
following maximization problems, we assume K000(q) > 0 for all q 2 (0;1).
MNE and HC can engage in a joint venture for sharing cash °ow rights. In this case,
® denotes MNE's share of the net pro¯ts, and (1 ¡ ®) HC's share, respectively. However,
HC has no funds to compensate MNE for such a transfer of cash °ow rights because it is
credit constrained. Note that, even if MNE and HC share cash °ow rights, the decision about
technology transfer q is taken by MNE alone. The costs of this technology transfer accrue to
the investment project. Therefore, it is assumed that a substantial part of these costs will be in
local currency and thus HC can share these costs even without access to international capital
markets or hard currency.
If the project is carried out as a joint venture, there is a potential spillover S from MNE
to HC that increases HC's payo®. To capture the reason why MNE might be worried about
spillovers, we assume that the spillover reduces MNE's payo®. The size of the e®ective spillover
depends on two things. It depends ¯rstly on MNE's decision to transfer technology, q. This
re°ects the fact that the gain from a spillover to HC is larger the better the technology trans-
ferred. And secondly, it depends on HC's ownership share (1¡®). This captures the idea that
HC can learn about the technology if, and only if, it has a stake in the project and hence access
to business secrets. Thus, the e®ective spillover is equal to q(1 ¡ ®)S.
8The investment project may also involve some ¯xed cost for setting up the project. Since our focus is on
the technology transfer, we normalize these set up costs to zero.
5The spillover can be e±cient in the sense that the direct reduction of the multinational's
payo® is smaller than the bene¯t for the domestic ¯rm and ine±cient in the reverse case. In
order to be able to vary the e±ciency of the spillover, we introduce an e±ciency parameter
¯ > 0. For ¯ = 1 the e®ective spillover is symmetric, i.e. the loss for MNE equals the bene¯t
to HC. If ¯ < 1 the e®ective spillover is e±cient and is ine±cient for ¯ > 1.
HC can take an active role in potentially two ways. It can choose to tax the investment
project, or it can undertake an investment to make the project more pro¯table. We consider
the two possibilities in turn. In scenario 1, the host country chooses T, a lump sum tax to
be paid in the case of success. In scenario 2, HC chooses an investment M that directly
bene¯ts the project. M may be interpreted as an investment in local infrastructure. The
di®erence between the two scenarios is that the tax T can only be raised if the project has
been successful, while the investment M is spent independently of the project's success. Thus,
M cannot be interpreted as just a negative tax, i.e. a subsidy. Furthermore, T is a one-to-one
transfer from the project to the host country. M comes at a cost of C(M), borne by HC, where
C(M) is an increasing, strictly convex function with C0(0) = 0. We assume that HC is able to
¯nance this infrastructure investment in local currency.
The purpose of our analysis is to investigate how the host country's policies a®ect the
multinational ¯rm's incentive to transfer technology. Therefore, we assume that HC commits
to its policy T or M before MNE chooses q.9 So the time structure of the model is as follows.
First HC decides about T or M. Then MNE chooses q. Finally, the payo®s are realized.
We can now summarize the payo®s for both parties in the two scenarios. In scenario 1,
where HC chooses tax T, the parties' payo®s are
U
T
MNE = q®[R ¡ T] ¡ q(1 ¡ ®)¯S ¡ ®K(q); (1)
9In our one period model this assumption is necessary to ensure that HC does not fully expropriate the
returns of the project through taxation. Of course, in a multiperiod setting, HC could modify its policy over







(1 ¡ ®)[R ¡ T + S] + T
¸
¡ (1 ¡ ®)K(q): (2)
In scenario 2, where HC chooses investment M, payo®s are
U
M




HC = q(1 ¡ ®)[R + M + S] ¡ C(M) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)K(q): (4)
3 Spillovers and Technology Transfer
As a reference case, we ¯rst describe MNE's incentive to transfer technology if HC does not
play an active role. For this purpose, we solve the model for both T and M equal to zero.
Consider MNE's decision on how much to invest in transferring technology. MNE maxi-
mizes
UMNE = q®R ¡ q(1 ¡ ®)¯S ¡ ®K(q): (5)
Given the assumptions about K(q), the optimal level of investment q is uniquely characterized
by the following ¯rst order condition:
K




Note that q depends on ®, due to the existence of spillovers. Using the implicit function
theorem, it is straightforward to show that q(®;S) increases in ® and decreases in S. How these
two parameters a®ect the parties' payo®s is summarized in the following Result.10
Result 1 MNE's payo® strictly decreases in S, whereas HC's payo® reaches a maximum at
S > 0. Overall welfare strictly decreases in S for symmetric and ine±cient spillovers, ¯ ¸ 1.
For e±cient spillovers, ¯ < 1, welfare reaches a maximum at S > 0.
10The proofs for this and all the following results and lemmas are summarized in an Appendix that is posted
on the following website: http : ==www:vwl:uni¡muenchen:de=ls schnitzer=english=research=schnitzer:htm
7The result shows that there is a clear con°ict of interest between both MNE and HC. MNE
loses from potential spillovers. To limit the damage it su®ers from the spillovers, it reduces its
technology transfer. HC, on the other hand, bene¯ts from the potential to learn from MNE. Its
preferred spillover level is strictly positive.11 From a welfare point of view, spillovers are bad,
not only if they are ine±cient, but even if they are symmetric. The reason for this is that they
make MNE choose an ine±ciently low level of technology transfer, thus reducing the potential
for joint pro¯ts. Only if spillovers are e±cient can their overall impact on welfare be positive,
provided that the e±ciency gain through spillovers is not outweighed by the e±ciency loss due
to a smaller technology transfer.
Let us consider next how the ownership structure of a joint venture a®ects payo®s and
e±ciency.
Result 2 MNE's payo® strictly increases in ®, whereas HC's payo® reaches a maximum at
® < 1. Overall welfare strictly increases in ® for symmetric and ine±cient spillovers, ¯ ¸ 1.
For e±cient spillovers, ¯ < 1, welfare reaches a maximum at ® < 1.
This result con¯rms the con°ict of interest between the two parties. HC can bene¯t from
the investment through R or S, only if it receives a share of its pro¯ts. MNE, on the other hand,
loses when sharing the pro¯ts. Since this, in turn, has a negative impact on the technology
transfer, overall welfare su®ers unless the spillover is su±ciently e±cient.
4 Spillovers and Taxation by the Host Country
We now turn to the question of how the host country's tax policy a®ects MNE's technology
transfer and vice versa. Recall that MNE maximizes (1). The optimal level of investment q is
now uniquely characterized by the following ¯rst order condition:
K
0(q




11Note that HC's payo® is not strictly increasing for in¯nite S, due to the negative impact of S ond MNE's
choice of q.
8In this scenario there are two things that may keep MNE from investing in technology
transfer q: potential spillover S and HC's taxation T. We know that a potential spillover S has
a direct negative impact on MNE's incentive to invest in q. Furthermore, qT(T;®) is a strictly
decreasing function of T for all T 2 (0;R ¡ 1¡®
® ¯S).
HC, on the other hand, now has three alternative ways of bene¯ting from the investment
project: through a share in the pro¯ts, through spillovers and through taxation. When deciding
on T, HC takes into account the e®ect of T on qT(T;®) and thus on the likelihood of gaining
through taxes, pro¯ts and spillovers.
HC maximizes (2). In the Appendix we prove that HC's maximization problem has a
unique interior solution T ¤(®;S) 2 (¡(1¡®)
¯¡®¯+®
® S;R¡ 1¡®
® ¯S).12 Hence, T ¤(®;S) satis¯es











T(T) = 0: (8)
Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The optimal taxation T ¤(®;S) strictly decreases in S.
HC reduces taxation in order to encourage the technology transfer if it expects to gain
from spillovers.
Spillovers now have two e®ects on MNE's technology transfer, a negative direct e®ect and
a positive indirect e®ect via T. Which of these e®ects dominates is a priori not clear. The
overall e®ects on technology transfer and payo®s are summarized in the following Result.
Result 3 (i) For ine±cient spillovers, ¯ > 1, S has a negative impact on technology transfer
qT, and on the payo®s of both MNE and HC.
(ii) For e±cient spillovers, ¯ < 1, S has a positive impact on technology transfer qT, and on
the payo®s of both MNE and HC.
12See Lemma A in the Appendix.
9(iii) For symmetric spillovers, ¯ = 1, S has no e®ect on the technology transfer qT or on
either of the parties payo®s.
There are two interesting observations to be made. Firstly, we ¯nd that, in contrast to
what we have seen in Section 3, a potential spillover need not in general reduce the incentive
to transfer technology. Whether or not it does so depends on the e±ciency of the spillover.
Secondly, we ¯nd that HC's tax policy aligns the interests of both MNE and HC with respect
to potential spillovers. Spillovers either hurt both or bene¯t both, depending on their e±ciency.
How does this come about?
Note that, when deciding on T, HC takes into account the overall impact of T and S on
MNE's incentive to transfer technology. If spillovers are e±cient, they allow HC to bene¯t
from the project in a more e±cient way than through taxation. So HC cuts taxes to encourage
MNE's technology transfer. MNE gains more from this tax cut than it loses from spillovers.
As a consequence, the technology transfer increases and both HC and MNE are better o®.
If, instead, spillovers are ine±cient, HC's tax cut does not fully compensate MNE's loss
from spillovers. So technology transfer is reduced and both sides are worse o®.
A special case emerges if the spillover is symmetric, ¯ = 1. In this case, the optimal tax
rate compensates exactly for the spillover such that the optimal investment remains unchanged.
To be more precise, the taxation will be lowered such that the sum of tax rate and spillover is
equal to the taxation when there is no spillover, i.e. T ¤(®;S) = T ¤(®;0) ¡ 1¡®
® S. Hence, for
¯ = 1 taxation and spillover are perfect substitutes from HC's point of view.
How are the incentives of the two parties a®ected by a change in the ownership structure?
In Section 3 above we have seen that MNE's payo® increases in ®. Is this still the case if HC's
policy is taken into account? Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2 The optimal tax T ¤(®;S) strictly increases in ®, i.e. decreases in (1 ¡ ®).
Intuitively, the higher the share of pro¯ts (1 ¡ ®) that goes directly to HC, the less HC will
tax in order to increase the expected pro¯ts of the joint venture. So the overall e®ect of ® on
10MNE's payo® is no longer clear. The following Result summarizes the e®ects of an increase in
the multinational's share ® on the payo®s of the two parties and on the e±ciency of the project.
Result 4 (i) An increase in ® has an ambiguous e®ect on MNE's payo®. For large values
of ®, there exist cases where MNE bene¯ts from giving up some share of the project to
HC.
(ii) For e±cient or symmetric spillovers, ¯ · 1, HC's payo® and the e±ciency of the project
are strictly decreasing as ® increases.
(iii) For ine±cient spillovers, ¯ > 1, there exist cases where HC's payo® and the e±ciency
of the project increase as ® increases. Moreover, there exist cases where HC's payo® and
the e±ciency of the project are maximized if ownership of the project is not shared.
Result 4 shows that there are circumstances where a joint venture agreement is mutually
bene¯cial even though this gives rise to spillovers. In contrast to our result above, we now
¯nd that MNE may bene¯t from sharing pro¯ts. The reason for this is that, by letting HC
participate in pro¯ts and spillovers, MNE can achieve a lower taxation.
On the other hand, we see that HC may no longer ¯nd it optimal to require a joint venture.
In contrast to before, HC now has means other than a joint venture for bene¯ting from the
project. So if the e®ects of potential spillovers in case of a joint venture are too harmful for
the technology transfer, HC may choose to restrict itself to taxation alone. This result gives
a rationale for why full ownership of the project by MNE can sometimes be in the interest of
HC even though only shared ownership gives rise to a spillover. This ¯nding is particularly
interesting for countries in transition or Eastern European countries where multinationals are
sometimes restricted to shared ownership arrangements by host governments. As we show, the
negative e®ects associated with shared ownership, i.e. the reduced incentive for MNE to invest
further, can become very strong. And, thus, it can be optimal for HC to restrict its own share
of the project or even not to share ownership at all, but rather to take advantage of a large
expected tax revenue.
11From a welfare point of view, however, we ¯nd a stronger case for joint ventures when
taxation is taken into account. For ¯ = 1, joint pro¯ts now strictly decrease in ®, whereas
without taxation they increase. For ¯ < 1, joint pro¯ts now strictly decrease in ® though this
was not always the case in Section 3. And, for ¯ > 1, joint pro¯ts may decrease in ® although
without taxation they were strictly increasing.
5 Spillovers and Investment by the Host Country
Now we ask how both parties' incentives are a®ected by a potential spillover if HC does not
impose a tax on the project but instead has the option for undertaking some infrastructure
investment M in order to increase the return to the project. MNE maximizes (3) by choosing
the optimal level of technology transfer q. This transfer is now a strictly increasing function of
M for all M > 0.
When HC decides on M, it takes into account the e®ect on qM(M;®) and thus on its
expected pro¯ts. HC maximizes (4). In the Appendix, we show the conditions under which
HC's payo® is maximized at M¤(®;S) 2 (M;1), where M = maxf0; 1¡®
® ¯S ¡ Rg.13 Hence,










M(M)(1 ¡ ®) ¡ C
0(M) = 0: (9)
Note that, if ® = 1, HC will choose M¤(1;S) = 0. Thus, the host country has an incentive to
invest in local infrastructure if, only if, ownership of the project is shared. Using the implicit
function theorem we can derive the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 The optimal infrastructure investment M¤(®;S) strictly increases in S.
By investing in local infrastructure HC encourages MNE to transfer technology. The larger S
is, the more HC is interested in doing so.
The following Result summarizes how our previous insights are changed if HC engages in
infrastructure investment rather than monetary transfers through taxation.
13See Lemma B in the Appendix.
12Result 5 (i) An increase in S can lower technology transfer qM and the payo®s of both
parties even if the spillover is e±cient, ¯ < 1.
(ii) An increase in S can increase technology transfer qM and the payo®s of both parties even
if the spillover is ine±cient, ¯ > 1.
We ¯nd that, like in the scenario with taxation, the presence of a potential spillover need
not in general reduce the incentive to transfer technology and so harm MNE's payo®. What
is new, however, is that an e±cient spillover no longer automatically has a positive impact,
nor does an ine±cient spillover automatically have a negative impact. The crucial issue now
is how strongly the spillover encourages HC to invest in infrastructure. Whenever a potential
spillover leads to a strong incentive to invest in infrastructure, the multinational is given a
stronger investment incentive as well. This, in turn, has a positive e®ect on payo®s. Obviously,
the host country's incentive to invest depends on the nature of the investment cost for local
infrastructure. If this cost is very low, then the e±ciency of the infrastructure investment
more than outweighs a potential e±ciency loss due to spillovers. So it is the joint e±ciency of
infrastructure investment and spillovers that matters now.
How are the incentives of both parties a®ected by a change in the ownership structure?
As before, we know that lowering the multinational's ownership share ® a priori reduces its
incentive to transfer technology. On the other hand, the incentive for HC to invest in local
infrastructure should increase as we state in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 The optimal infrastructure investment M¤(®;S) decreases in ®.
This, in turn, has an indirect positive e®ect on the incentive for MNE. Whether one of the
e®ects dominates is not clear. The following Result points out how the impact of ownership
shares may change in the case of an infrastructure investment.
Result 6 (i) An increase in ® has an ambiguous e®ect on MNE's payo®. For large values
of ®, there exist cases where MNE bene¯ts from giving up some share of the project to
HC.
13(ii) There exist cases where HC's payo® and the e±ciency of the project increase over some
interval of ® < 1, even if the spillover is e±cient, ¯ < 1.
As we see, there are again cases where the multinational voluntarily agrees to a joint venture.14
As before, the rationale is to give HC an incentive to invest in infrastructure. Moreover, we
¯nd that it is sometimes e±cient and in the interest of HC to restrict its ownership share.
Surprisingly, this can happen even if the spillover is e±cient, ¯ < 1. Why is this so? Whether
or not HC wants to hold a share of the project depends on the exact nature of the investment
cost. If this cost is too high relative to the return on investment, HC has little incentive to invest.
This, in turn, results in only a small positive e®ect on the incentive to transfer technology by
MNE. So, in a way, the less cost e®ective or e±cient the infrastructure investment, the less this
can be compensated by an e±cient spillover.
Note ¯nally, that, in this scenario, it cannot be in HC's interest to refrain from participating
in a joint venture. Without taxation, HC can bene¯t from the project only if it holds a share
in the project.
6 Empirical Implications
Our model gives rise to a number of empirical predictions. From Result 1 in Section 3, we can
derive the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Suppose that the host country takes no active role in taxing or supporting a
multinational's investment. Then the larger the potential for a spillover, the smaller MNE's
incentive to transfer technology.
But in Sections 4 and 5 we found that a local government should be interested in supporting
MNE's investment if it expects to bene¯t from spillovers, as stated in Lemmas 1 and 3.
Hypothesis 2 The larger the potential for a spillover, the smaller the risk of excessive taxation
and the larger the contribution of the local government to local infrastructure.
14Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) ¯nd evidence that host country characteristics that increase productivity of
local assets tend to lower the foreign equity share. This might be in the interest of the foreign investor because
it provides an incentive for the host country to improve its infrastructure and thereby enhance productivity.
14If the host country's policy measures are taken into account, then the impact of spillovers
on MNE's incentive to transfer technology are no longer always negative, as we have seen in
sections 4 and 5. How spillovers a®ect technology transfer is now related to their e±ciency, as
described in Results 3 and 5.
Hypothesis 3 Suppose that a host country takes an active role in taxing or supporting a multi-
national's investment. Then potential spillovers tend to have a positive e®ect on the incentive
to transfer technology if the e®ective spillover is e±cient and a negative e®ect if the e®ective
spillover is ine±cient.
As we see, one crucial issue for testing these hypotheses is how to capture the e±ciency of
the spillovers. Whether or not MNE loses if HC learns, and by how much, naturally depends on
their respective competitive situations. If they are operating in completely di®erent markets,
then MNE has little to fear if HC learns from MNE's technology transfer. In this case, the
spillover could be called e±cient, ¯ < 1. If, on the other hand, they are operating in the same
market, it is likely that MNE loses more than HC gains from any spillover.15 Thus, this would
be a case of ine±cient spillover, ¯ > 1. So we can rephrase Hypothesis 3 in the following way.
Hypothesis 4 Suppose that a host country takes an active role in taxing or supporting a
multinational's investment. Then potential spillovers tend to have a negative e®ect on the
incentive to transfer technology if MNE and HC compete in the same market, and a positive
e®ect if MNE and HC operate in di®erent markets.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
As previous studies have suggested and have often argued, foreign direct investment is a source
of the di®usion of knowledge and technology. It is well recognized that sharing ownership with
a local partner can reveal a multinational's proprietary knowledge and, in that way, give rise
15To see this, consider the following example: Suppose MNE acts as a monopolist before the technology
transfer, earning monopoly pro¯t ¼M. After the spillover occurs, both MNE and HC become duopolists, both
earning ¼D. For very general demand and cost functions it can be shown that ¼M > 2¼D. So MNE's loss from
losing its monopoly position, ¼M ¡ ¼D, exceeds HC's gain, ¼D.
15to technology spillovers. The extent of such technology spillovers depends on the nature of the
technology transferred and on the ownership structure in the joint venture.
In contrast to often-voiced arguments, we have shown that potential spillovers do not
necessarily keep multinational investors from transfering technology to other countries. The
reason is that spillovers are also taken into account by the host country when choosing its
policy. If spillovers are an e±cient way of participating in the multinational's gain, then the
host country may compensate the multinational for its losses through spillovers by choosing
appropriate policy measures.
We have also shown that joint ventures may be in the interest of both host country and
multinational, even if the multinational cannot be directly compensated for giving up part of
its cash °ow rights. This is the case if the host country is induced to support the investment
through policy measures. On the other hand, there are circumstances where a joint venture is
not in the interest of the host country. This insight is particularly interesting to countries in
Central and Eastern Europe and to transition countries, where sharing of ownership is often
required by host country governments. Their justi¯cation for these requirements is that, in this
way, the di®usion of knowledge is facilitated and economic growth is spurred. But as we have
shown exactly the opposite may occur.
The present analysis sheds some light on how local participation in international joint ven-
tures a®ects the extent of spillovers. We have argued that the extent of the e®ective spillover
depends not only on the ownership structure but also on the transfer of technology and on the
host country's policy. These factors depend on country speci¯c and industry-speci¯c determi-
nants. Whether or not a larger ownership share of the host country ¯rm leads to more spillovers
is a priori not clear and can di®er across countries and industries. This observation may help
explain why the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. While BlomstrÄ om and SjÄ oholm
found no e®ect, Dimelis and Louri, and Smarzynska Javorcic found evidence that the degree of
domestic ownership matters with respect to the magnitude of spillovers. Our analysis suggests
that more detailed empirical analysis is required to better understand this relationship.
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